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.A Condensation of

a Study Prepared for and Published
by the Kilgore Committee

POST

WAR WORLD COUNCIL

FOREWORD
DRIFT toward business combination, sometimes open, someTHE
times secret, has heen conspicuous feature of the national and

a
international economy of the last two generations. Government has
often attacked these combinations and, in other instances, has sanctioned them, as in the case of many international cartels, and with
NRA in this country in the recent depression.

There is no doubt that, aside from the United Nations in the war
emergency, business organizations form our chief international structure. No political diplomacy is so swift and sure as the working of
international cartels. These networks of business combination reach
across frontiers knowing no patriotism, only the call of profit.
There is a serious question as to whether international political
organization can be made strong enough to cope with the international business organizations which already exist. If international
economic agenci&- are set up to deal with currency stabilization,
investment, food, and so forth, will they be strong enough to
cope with the half concealed business groups which span national

boundaries?
Because we believe that a n understanding of international cartels
is essential to an understanding of the post-war problems we face,
the Post War World Council is pleased to offer this pamphlet as
a valuable basis for study. It is a condensation of a report by
Dr. Corwin D. Edwards, prepared for and published by the SubCommittee on War Mobilization of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Senator Harley M. Kilgore, chairman. Every effort has
been made, while reducing the length of the original report drastically, to preserve its tone and spirit.
*

December, 1944

POST WAR WORLD COUNCIL

I

INTERNATIONAL CARTELS
AND WORLD PEACE

.

C A R T E L activities are arrangements among business enterprises
engaged in the same type of industry to avoid some or all forms
of competition.
International cartels are cartels which include business enterprises
domiciled under more than one government and doing bushes across
national frontiers. A cartel of this type may include the major enterprises operating in a-given industrial field throughout the world, and
may determine trade policies in that field in most of the world's principd markets.
Uhless there is an international cartel, the power of a business group
within a single country is li&ted by foreign competition, subject to
whatever protection tariff policies and international shipping costs
may provide.
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Principal Types of International Cartel:
The Asmciation:-The international cartel association resembles
a national trade association which is engaged in rktrictive activities.
Tlqz menabers of such a body are producing companies in various
nadons. The cartel arrangement is expressed in a more or less formal
agreement to which all are parties or in the rules and regulations of
tbe associatibn itself. Such cartels m a y formally agree to fix prices;
to l i d t and apportion output, sales, or exports; to allocate market
territories; to redistribute profits in accordance with an agreed formula; or even to sell through a jointly maintained sales agency. - ' .
I.
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The Pagent Licensing Agreement:-Amobg large manufacturing
';
enterprises, especially in industrieiin which technological progress has
been rapid, the most common type of international cartel is the agree-.
ment as to patents and processes. Such an agreement rests upon-the . 3
fact that the participants in the cartel hold patents and/or operate
under patent licenses. In most countries the control of a,patent gives
the owner certain monopolistic rights.
A fully developed patents and processes agreement is a marketsharing arrangement based upon ap arrangement for exchange of
the results of scientific .research. Each party to the agreement under-2.

'

takes to grant to the other the right to make use of the processeg
developed in its research, both past and future. The achievements of
the research are patented inevery country covered by the agreement,
and the right to use is conveyed by assignment of the patents or by
licenses under the patents. The allocation of markets is carried out
by means of such assignments and licenses.
In addition to the allocation of territories and industrial fields which
is involved in the scope of the patent licenses, the terms of these
licenses may contain provisions as to the prices at which the license&
may sell, the quantities they may produce, the types of concerns
through which they may distribute, and various other aspects of their
business activities.
As a network of interrelated patents and processes agreements is
developed, it necessarily requires a tacit if not an explicit acceptance
by each company of a series of agreements to which that company
is not a party. When Imperial Chemical Industries makes an agree- ment with du Pont, it must introduce into this agreement restrictions
which adequately,recognize and protect its commitments to I. Go
arbe en and Solvay. In dealing with other chemical companies,
'du Pont must likewise avoid commitments inconsistent with those
it has made to Imperial Chemical Industries, and Imperial Chemical
Industries must observe the limitations of its contract with du Pont.
A series of mutually related undertakings such as this, governing
progressively larger portions of the technology of the chemical industry, must make it increasingly di$cult for any chemical company to
follow an independent commercial policy without involving itseif in
such ~crificcof alliances and loss of information as must be too costly
to be willingly accepted.
Since the significance of any single patents and processes agreement
is thus enhanced by its relation to other similar agreements, the full
effect of patent license controls within a given industry can be ascertained only by surveying the entire pattern of such controls, not by
examining individual patent licenses.
Cartel arrangements based upon patents may endure far -beyond
'the statutory limits of the patent grant. Contracts which cover both
existing and future patents may continue in effect indefinitely, for
new patents age invoked to support allocation of territories as the old
patents expire.
.
-h

3. The Combine:-The

third form of cartel is the combine. It con-

I

rsob i a a t m t j t i d alks ~ tby .a a f a c e bbt by ~Gtingmmppitor~
undei a corn~wnersbipor mw$emcnt. Corporate structure rhuD b e S the basks for market tommb In the simplest ,Ad most fib ' quent case, a small ~ ~ T P C ) Z & combination-ina particular fkld d I
indwtdd aCt;vity is part of a larger cartel pattern maintained by
intercoxprate corntracts of, broader scope. lh a few instances, the
&G&&m bf m e 'or two concerns &e so extensive as to donstimte
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W b r portion of an international erne1 arrangement.
u

'narrower types of carteliza$on through ownership may be
&iadtl. and simply illustrated. As a part of a broader systtim of intercorporate arrangements, the du Pont Co. shares with a subsidiary of
I. GoFarbenindustrie ownership of the 3ayer-Semesa.n Co., through
which both great corporations cairy on all of their business in ~ & d
States peitaining to seed disinfectants. In Canada, C a n a d i ~Indus:
ui&, *Ltd., is the jointly owned subsidiary of du Pont and Imperial
Chemical Industries, which. have mutually agreed that in Chemical
fields occ@ied by both companies th& chemical manufacturing and
importing activities Canada shall be undertaken exclusivdy by this
~obsidiary.-Both in Brazil -and in Argentina the same two grek companies have o r h i e d subsidiaries known as Duperial, and in each
>cit&$they
have agreed to do business in the country only through tihi; .,?
: .'*
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The &re exte.givi internatioqal combines resemble the great cori

,.$

I

,!

'structyyx-which are familiar within any modern. industrid
&@fry.
c
q
s
a they consist *ofgroups of corporations bound '
togetha by.ilqborate interlockbgs of stack ownership. International ,
. TeiePhOhe'& T=le$riph'Co,for examhk, is a holding cdmpany which .
.holds all or most of the stock of a' variety of cable, radio commUBica- ' .
ti& h d .telephone ;Companies throughout' the world. It a h holds
the stock of ~nter~l~ational
standard E1&ctric~
Corporation, which id
turn is a holding company controIling companies throughout the
world engaged in the manufaaure of comm~cations,
equipment.
;
Similarly, there are in many different countries companies organ&d
under the name of N. V. Philips engaged in the manufacture and :
distribution of radio equipment, electric light bulbs, and other el=trical suklies. With so much of the field of electrical .manufacture '
brought together under the ownership of Philips and International
Telephone & Telegraph, it is a relatively simple matter for these two
concerns and one or two other great organizations to complete &$ie
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the pattern of world industrial cartelization by contracts among
themselves.
Cartels as Devices to Control Markets:
These three types of cartel arrangement frequently supplement one
another. The communities of interest established by combination may
be joined into larger interest groups by agreements as to patents and
processes and by formal membership in cartel associations. The patent
agreements may include provision for the operation of joint subsidiaries in particilar markets.
Whatever their scope or type, international cartels are designed to
,enhance profits by reducing competition. This aim is typically sought
by direct price fixing; allocation of production, sales, shipments, or
trade territories, in order to destroy incentives toward price cutting;
limitation of output in order to keep prices from falling; and measures
intended to exclude nonparticipants from the market.
I. Control over Prices:-The
central purpose of cartels is to maintain prices at levels higher than would otherwise obtain. Sometimes
this result is sought by direct price-fixing agreements, but more frequently by controls of production' and allocations of markets such as
will be subsequently described.
Such price control has been widely ddended as a useful stabilization
of prices or as a necessity in order to prevent cutthroat competition.
It has been attacked on the ground that to keep prices stable while
underlying conditions change is merely to throw the burden of adjugment elsewhere, and that price fluctuation is prdekable to idle
machinery and idle men. Discussion couched in such broad and
theoretical terms is necessarily inconclusive and will not be undertaken here.
The price policies followed during negotiations for the establishment of a cartel and at times when members of the cartel are
attempting to intimidate or discipline independents must be distinguished from the price policies of a period when the cartel's control
is unquestioned. The antecedent to a cartel agreement is often a
price war which may drive prices down to absurd levels. In public
apologies for cartels such wars are usually treated as impersonal die
asters for which cartel organization provides a constructive remedy.
In fact, however, such price wars are often deliberately undertaken
as means to coerce rebellious elements in the industry to accept what
the cartel group is willing to offer.
'

The level of prices estabhhd by-cart& after rhtir control a£ tbe
market is assured di&s from case to case in accordance with what
the u&c will bear. New products which have a large potentid
market are frequently oihtd at ptcigressivelly lower prices until s
level has betn reached which taps potenW,demand; but thereai3e.r
further dadine in p r i c k likely to be dm and .limited. When the
orgzwhtian of a -cartel hao beem d& to w d y low prices origL
natk$:m ura-ted
c l u m p in demand ar in produetivt mmaj be h e r rhan that which fomerlp prevailed in
- & &el
. the industry, even though probably higher than that whieh would be
PP1"f*t:k
~b .thencfflt.ci-cie~
under competitive conditions.
h n e t m a e e b h +&aka.it possible to take advantage -of i m p ti+eLnocdi,fut the product and to establish prices at oppmsiocfy high
levels which -deprive
would-be -purchasers of the opportuni~
to buy. ' The! extremes to which'pri& may go under some cartel
arrangements are best indicated by'illustraticm.
.Tuneen d i e is a bard-metal compogition of great iadupuia
ippxtancie ip cutting tools, d o n d i e and wear-resistant s&c;e8.
It was sold in theJJnited States in rep* at @ per p ~ ~ n dAt. that
timc Gaeral Electric and Friedrich Krupp Aktiengedkchdt b d
an apeemeat by which their patents were pooled. General Electtic
war giyq~eon4.
the tale price in the United States, and h p p
w~ d&gqp4 to.w
e tbis prke upon its imports. Thereupon the
-~~td.~Bpts",p
ros
&eepysm& to a maximum of $453 per porn&
Dwhgmw
- d , h - t h i r t i a zthc
ratage wap frmn $q
to $455
;&din z g q a t b t h m , p & wos~n-t#r;gtrpound. In April
rw-&er q indictment under the mtitmt bwi, the price rangad
fmm ity.m j;45 l= pound*
The e f k t of the high price was evidently to disoourage the dm+
m a t of ttujgstendide technology. A director of Rrum wrote &I
1936 that Germany then comumd about 22 tima more of this.prduct
per unit ofl produced std than did the United States. 'Ilk q l a n a ~
tion for rBis lag in use was given in 1931 in a letter from a b e d
Electric engineer which referred to the "absurdly fictitious prices .which
are beisg maintained for carboby . (tunsm carbide) tips." H e
asserted that the ma&-g
cost was-about $8 per pound, and
proposed vainly that the price be,reduced to %o per pound.
The high price of certain dental plastics has been equally striking.
As a r&dt of cartel agreements among E*I. du Pont de Nunours &
Co., Rohm 6r Haas Co. of the U
6
i
t
c
d States, I. G; Farbeninddc,
I

.
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Imperial Chemical Industries, and Rohm & Haas Co. of Germany,
the two American companies participating obtained control of the
United States market for acrylic products, including methyl methacrylate dentures. This control was used to fix prices upon dental
plastics in the United States. Information is not readily available with
which to appraise the basic price of 85 cents a pound which was used
for the sale of methyl methacrylate powders to commercial molders,
but & is obvious that, if this price covered costs, nothing but the pow=
of the monopoly could -account for the price of $45 a pound which
was charged in the sales of the s&e product for denture purposes
to dental laboratories and dentists. At that time the total investment
in methyl methacrylate manufacture at the Bell plant was $g86,000 and
the net profit for the first 6 months of the year had been $210,000.
Striking illustrations of the high prices which are sometimes established by cartel agreements are found in the field of drugs and pharmaceuticals. Atabrine, a synthetic substitute for quinine, is now sold to
the United States Government for war purposes at a price of $4.50
per thousand tablets.
The high prices obtained upon electric lamp bulbs in the United
States by virtue of the interrelated restrictions of the American patent
monopoly and the international lamp cartel are evident in the fact
that, according to computations by the Department of Justice from
figures supplied by the General Electric Co., from 1935 through 1939,
General Electric's net profit on incandesceat lamps varied from 64 to
88 percent of total costs and expenses-in lamp manufacture and from
33 to 47. percent of the net worth of the company's lamp-producing
investment.
The effect of cartel agreements on dyestuffs has evidently been a
substantial.increase in prices.
At a conference between du Pont and Imperial Chemical Industries
in 1937, it was agreed that proposals for new capital investment in
manufacture in South America should be tested by their likelihood
of yielding, after payment of all South-American taxes, a minimum
rate of return of 15 percent' in Argentina and 17% percent in Brazil
and Chile.
Impairment of Qdity:-Though
cartels seldom concern themselves directly with the quality of cartelized goods, a necessary effect
of their monopolistic character is to diminish incentives to improve
quality and to limit opportunities for the buyer to protect himself
2.

against low equality. Instances are encountered in which cartel agreements maintain a market for relatively unsatisfactory goods because
other participants in the cartel are bound not to accept the dissatisfied
customers.
An example appears in the agreement as to military explosives which
divided the European market between Nobel Industries, Ltd., and
E. I; du Pont de Nemours from 1 ~ to6 1932. Under this plan each
company was allotted a fixed percentage of the sales of certain types
of powder, and the sales agents of each company were assigned territories within which they were to act'for both companies. The effect
of this arrangement as to nitrocellulose powder was to maintain a
market for Nobel in Europe through the forbearance of du Pont, in
spite of the fact that du Pont's powder was gentrally regarded as
superior. In other cases, a superior product may be degraded or withdrawn in order to prevent it from superseding a product heady
established.
The cartel arrangements concerning electric lamps illustrate the
impunity with which quality may be degraded. Under international1
qartel agreements the American market has been resenred for the
American manufacturing companies, General Electric and Westinghouse, and markets in other parts of the world have been allocated.
Protected from foreign competition, American manufacturers have
attempted to increase their business by reducing the durability of their
light bulbs. They were able to find an excuse for their action in the
fact that the efficiency of a light bulb is in inverse ratio to its length
of He; but they were careful not to inform consumers of the decision
to sacrifice durability, nor to allow an opportunity for the buyer to
choose between more efficient and more durable bulbs.
One purpose for which quality may be deliberately reduced is to
prevent a commodity sold at a low price from being substituted for
another which the same vendor is able to sell at a higher price.
Adulteration intended to accomplish this purpose was proposed in
connection with the price differentials on methyl methacrylate which
have already been referred to. Certain acute durchasers of dental supplies had discovered that they could obtain the methyl methacrylate
for dentures at an incredibly reduced price by buying it as commercial
mdding powder. As a consequence, the producers undertook to
develop some means of preventing such purchases, which they referred
to as "bootlegging." On March 15, 1940, the Vernon-Benschoff Co.
wrote to the American Rohm & Haas Co. as follows:
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''Olri discussion of the Pure Food and Drug Law and pulling the
acrylic denture under it leads me to wonder if the manufacturers of
the commercial molding powders might not add an ingredient which
would not affect the molding properties, but which would disquahfy
it under the act.
"Under the very finicky regulations of 'the above act however, it
may be the slightest trace of the right agent, too little to constitute
harm to molding (or health either as a matter of fact) would suffice
to have bootleg products in bad.
"A millionth of one percent'of arsenic or lead might cause them to
cohfiscate every bootleg unit in the country. There ought to be a trace
of something that would make them rear up."
3. AUocarion of Trade Tm*taries:--One of the most prevalent
cartel methods is allocation of territories to individual concerns or
groups. Each participant undertakes no( to sell in territory assigned
exclusively to others, and often agrees also not to sell to customers
who are likely to export to such territory. The effect of such undertakings is to restrict investment abroad, to restrict expo* not only
by cartel members but by their customers, and to deprive consumers
of imported commodities. The purpose of such agreements is to
acquire a monopolistic position in markets which are regarded as
peculiarly valuable.
Since the primary interest of American participants has consisted
in the enjoyment of an unchallenged position in the rich domestic
market of the United States, and perhaps the Canadian market, they
have usually been willing to sacrifice possibilities of export and of
investment abroad as the price of such a position. Similarly, foreign
companies have been willing to purchase protection in other markets
by foregoing sales in the United States.
The arrangements between Imperial Chemical Industries and du
Pont involve allocations of territory for 20 or more different classes of
products. With exceptions for certain special products du Pont is
granted exclusive rights in the United States and Central America
and Imperial Chemical Industries exclusive rights in the British
Empire except Canada. The two companies have agreed that they
will exploit the Canadian, Brazilian, and Argentine markets through
jointly owned subsidiaries. Both companies remain free to sell in
other portions of the world.
Territorial restrictions were applied to American manufacture of
*

Diesel engines in an agreement between Allgemeine Elektrizitaets
Gesebchaft, General Electric C o , and BuschSulzer Bros. in May.
1930. The license agreement provided that-"The territory in which
such engines may be sold and used is the United States and all other
countries of the world except Europe and the Dutch Colonies."
Such arrangements to divide world markets upon a territorial basis
impose rigid limits to the territoria expansion of international trade
in cartelized industries. Whether the total amount of such trade for
any particular country -is greater or less than it would have been in
the absence of a cartel probably depends partly upon the strength and
shrewdness of the parties to the bargain domiciled there and partly
upon the importance which they attach to exclusive control of their
home market.

4. -Restriction of Supply:-In some cases cartel restrictions take the form of absolute limits upon the amount which may be produced,
sold, or exported. This form of restriAion obviously subordinates the
eonsumersy demand for additional quantities to the industry's desire
for additional prufits. Cartels which are formed to meet the socalled
overproduction created by a declining market or by the appearance
of new capacity are peculiarly likely to undertake direct limitation of
supply.
T h e tin cartel formed in 1931 was a conspicuous example, though
it was peculiar in that
- it was organized by an international governmental convention. An unsuccessful attempt in ~ c p gto curtail the
production of tin by purely private means was the origin of this quasipublic venture. A private association of tin producers, which at first
controlled 21 percent of the annual output and subsequently attained
control of between 50 and 75 percent, failed to restrict output because
of differences of opihion as to policy and lack of suf5cie.t authority.
The governments of British Malaya, Bolivia, the Dutch East Indies,
and Nigeria established an International Tin Co-mmittee in 1931 and
made restriction of output compulsory by law.
- The international steel cartel has also relied upon restrictions of
the producers of ~ e l ~ k r n ,
output and of'exports. In the late IF'S
France, Germany, Luxemburg, the Saar Valley, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary adhered to a basic production quota which
was calculated from the output of the first quarter of 1926. Total permissible tonnage was fixed quarterly by .a management committee

and was distributed among the participants according to agreed percentages. A fund was established from which compensation was to be
paid to national groups which did not produce their full quota and
fines were assessed upon groups which exceeded their quotas. Subsequently, during the I ~ ~ o ' sa , new agreement as to exports was developed among producers in Belgium,. Germany, Saar, France, and Luxemburg. Under this plan, a management committee made quarterly
determinations of the amouht of steel to be exported and divided the
totals among national groups according to percentages based upon
their past exports. Like the previous plan, the export controls were
accompanied by fines and indemnities for those who exceeded or fell
below their quotas.

5. Allocation of Production and of Industrial F&:--Closely
associated with industry-wide programs for the restriction of output are
arrangements which set limits upon the amount or nature of production by certain particular concerns. Occasionally these limits are stated
as fixed quantities. More frequently they are stated as percentages of
the output by other specified concerns. Where one concern overshadows its fellows, such a system of allocation by percentages means
that a decision by the dominant concern as to how much it will produce prescribes automatic limits for the others. In other cases, the
assigned-percentages deprive each producer of incentive to compete
for more business against the others and thus tend to bring about
a restriction of the total supply. Even more frequently the arrangement is to exclude particular concerns from producing designated types
of commodities, so that control of the supply is left entirely in the
hands of one or more enterprises to which each kind of commodity
is assigned.
Many of these restrictions are imposed in connection with patent
licenses and may be interpreted as expressions of the monopoly power
enjoyed by the holder of a -patent.
An instance of percentage limitation of a concern's output appears
in the production of methyl methacrylate cast sheeting. A recent
letter by a du Pont executive describes the way in which this limitation
was temporarily set aside to prevent it from throttling the -production
of bomber noses and other war materials:
"I was up to see Mr. Haas Monday with respect to the licenses we
hold to operate under his patents for making cast sheeting. You will
perhaps recall that we are limited to 50 percent of his capacity. I

8

explained to Mr. Haas that we were booked up solid until October
of the present year under this restriction and asked him whether he
wanted us to tell the Government that we were limited by the license
or whether he preferred to lift the restriction. He agreed to lift the
restriction during the present emergency."
Agreements by which cartel members are excluded from the production of particular types of commodity reserved for others are extremely
frequent. One of the most conspicuous is that established in 1929
between I. G. Farbenindustrie and the Standard Oil Co. of New
Jersey. Standard described the result of this agreement as follows:
"The I. G. are going to stay out of the oil business proper and we
are going to stay out of the chemical business insofar as that has no
bearing on the oil business."
Cartels as Devices to Restrict Production and Technological
Change:
I. Restriction of Capacity to Produce:--Closely related to limitation
of supply is restriction of new industrial capacity. Such restrictions
are often undertaken when existing capacity is partly idle and there
is a likelihood that new capacity will mean either larger production
and declining '.
prices or a further reduction in the output of established plants. Sometimes ef30rts are made to delay the construction
of efficient plants to replace obsolescent ones. sometimes restriction is
intended to retard the development of a substitute product which
dnight permanently reduce the market for an older product. Sometimes the primitry concern is to keep out of the industry enterprises
which might be unwilling to collaborate in cartel policies. Often a
restriction is intended to deal with two or more of these problems at
once.
In the nitrogen industry, European producers of synthetic nitrogen
have resisted the construction of new plants in the United States for
fear of so-called overproduction, while Chilean producers of natural
nitrates have resisted the substitution of the synthetic for the natural
product.
, Productive capacity in the American magnesium industry was
restricted before the present war by a cartel arrangement in which
each participant accomplished a different purpose. The Aluminum
Co. of America prevented the development of magnesium as an .
important substitute for aluminum. Dow Chemical Q. avoided the

construction of competing plants which might have jeopardized
Dow's high prices. I. G. Farbenindustrie avoided the risk of American
exports to Europe.
Similar restrictions were developed in the fabrication of magnesium
in the United States by an arrangement under which the same cartel
members cross-licensed each other but interposed obstacles to fabrication by others. In consequence, the production and use of magnesium
~
in this country lagged far behind the development in ~ e r m a nand
there was a serious shortage of experience and equipment for fabricating magnesium at the outbreak of the <presentwar.

restriction^ Upon Invention and Technologicd Change:-Desiring to limit expansion of output and avoid the development of uncontrolled substitute processes, cartels are necessarily suspicious of new
technological developments. They readily undertake research to discover new uses for their old products but often discourage the development of new processes or new products.
In the desire to improve their patent position, large international
concerns, which, acting together, can enjoy a monopoly of power
based upon patents, usually spend substantial sums upon research.
There is little doubt that the systematic conduct of experiments within
a field of research which has already been laid out is expedited by
such expenditures. There is dispute as to whether the routinized
research of these large companies is equally successful in producing
the basic inventions which open nkw fields of inquiry. Moreover, it
is obvious that many of the inventions which take place in patentcontrolled industries are not intended for industrial use, but are for
the purpose of fencing-in an industrial field; that is, patenting the
process in order to prevent others from making use of the invention.
In industries in which patents are used as the basis of industrial
power, exchange of patents among the parties to a cartel agreement
broadens the field of use of particular inventions and makes a larger
portion of the technology available to each participating concern.
In some cases in which companies are bound together by permanent
agreement to exchange patents and processes, there is an interchange
of the details of operating experience, described as "know how." If
such candid exchanges were general, the situation within the cartel
would approach that which would prevail in the economy generally
if all new inventions were dedicated to the public use. Indeed, it
would involve even less concealment of trade secrets. But in practice
2.
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the tehnical advantages of pooled information are subordinated to
commercial considerations, and exchanges of information are often
strictly limited. The exchange of information among parties to the
cartel agreement is dependent upon the working out of methods to
prevent them from competing. In some cartels a dominant company
seeks to preserve and'strengthen its position by discouraging research
on the'part of other companies.
Among cartel members the commercial application of technical
progress is often retarded. When an invention of fundamental character appears likely to bring about sharp reductions in demand or a
rapid obsolescence of established productive processes, a cartel is likely
to delay introduction of the process so long as it darei.
The ingenuity of the research organizations which serve cartels is at
times perverted to the development of techniques by which the power
of a cartel may be preserved. If a cartel has achieved high prices in
selling to one group of customers, its scientists may be asked to provide obstacles against efforts by these customers to buy cheaper goods
elsewhere. This form of research is illustrated by the activities of one
of the world's largest laboratories, engaged in organic chemical
research for the du Pont Co. Du Pont had developed a pigment
which could be used either as a paint or as a textile dye but feared
that the latter use would upset the structure of prices upon textile
dye-stufZs.
In June 1940 the laboratory reported:
Mr.Chantler was of
the opinion that
mixtures, unsuitable for textile printing
would be very difficult to obtain." "Such substances as ground glass
and carborundum were suggested for incorporation with the pigment.
While these materials would undoubtedly scratch printing rolls, there
is considerable doubt as to their effect in paints and lacquers."
Two days later the matter was thoroughly discussed in a conference with representatives of General Aniline Works. The resourcefulness with which research in methods of- adulteration had been carried on appears in the following excerpts from a memorandum of the
conference:
"Detetiorate Cotton-Compounds might be incorporated into CPC
which when applied to textiles and followed by bleaching or heating
treatment might increase the deterioration of the cloth. Compounds
such as chlorates or aliphatic halides which would produce hydrochloric acid were specific examples.

". . .
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"Irritating Substances-It is known that certain resins and solvents
are irritating to the skin, often causing dermatitis. It might be possible to formulate a CPC composition which will make textile materials irritating to the skin.
"Incorporation of Grit-It seemed too dangerous to attempt to add
gritty material to CPC since, although it would interfere with the
use of the material for textiles, it would also offer serious disadvantages in grinding on application of surface coatings.
"It was agreed that the mere dulling of the material would not be
a satisfactory solution since dull shades are often used in the textile

.

trade. , ."
Information is lacking with which to estimate the relative proportion of the research effort of cartels which' is devoted to the improvement of industrial processes and products, to the development of
patents which are intended to keep others out of an industrial field
without being used by the patent owner, and to study of methods
for the worsening of products such as have been described above.
3. Eflorts to Weaken Independent Enterprises:-An almost inevitable part of cartel policy is a concerted effort by cartel members to
weaken independent concerns. The means available to a cartel are
similar to those used by a domesic combination in restraint of t r a d e
concerted efforts to cut off raw materials, organization of boycotts
among distributors, exclusive dealing contracts, concerted refusals to
grant patent licenses or permit access to technology, harrassment by
litigation, localized price wars, and similar forms of pressure. The
contracts &eady described, by which independents are deprived of
the services of inventors or of the opportunity to license their inventions to concerns which deal wi& the cartel, express efforts to weaken
independents. Threats of patent litigation are often success£ul in
forcing an independent concern to come to terms with the cartel.

+ The Relation of

Cartelization to Eficiency:-The effect of cartels
upon the efficiency of industrial production cannot be directly determined without examination of comprehensive records of cost extending aver considerable periods of time. Such evidence as is available,
however, indicates that the characteristic purposes of cartels point
away from efficiency and that their activities tend to diminish
efficiency.
One of the most frequent purposes of cartelization is to prevent
the destruction of relatively high cost enterprises. The endeavor is

to share the business among the available concerns, with the necessary
result that the least efficient obtain a claim to continued existence and
to a specified market upon the same basis as the most efticientt. In
the nitrogen cartel agreement of 1930,high cost concerns were actually
given larger relative quotas than low cost concerns. .
Except at times in Germanantrolled territory under the pressure
of the Nazi government, price agreements by cartEls have usually
established prices at levels mutually satisfactory, that is, levels which
even the highest cost concerns were willing to accept. Thus cartels
often set aside the function of competition in spurring businessmen
to greater efficiency and in eliminating the in&cient, but seldom provide alternative means to accomplish the same purpse.
In the development of technology, mtels tend to enhance efficiency
insofar as this result follows from a pooling of inventions and exchange
of know-how, and to retard efficiency insofar as they keep new
processes from being adopted and deprive nonmembers of an opportunity to share in the benefits of technological progress. The claims of
cartels to reduce the cost of ordinary business and industrial operations
are very slight.
With the minor exceptions just mentioned, the cartel pattern typically consists of market.arrangements which do not lltufv the managements of the various concerns. The opportunities to reduce the cost
of production by such agreements are limited indeed. One is the
chance to avoid some but not all of the costs which arise from
fluctuation in the rate of output; for under a cartel, fluctuations based
upon changes in demand must still take place sooner or later. Another
possible saving, which, however, is not a true economy, may &me
from the lower purchase prices upon raw materials which the cartel
members may sometimes obtain if they have a monopolistic buying
position. Set against these factors are the increases of cost which ordinarily may be expected to result from restriction of output by the
cartel.
But assuming that cartels increase efficiency, the value of the
achievement is questionable so long as cartel control endures. The
interest of the community in greater efficiency is ordinarily based
upon the belief that lower costs will lead to lower prices and thus
enhance consumption. Efficiency in a monopolistic combination
redounds primarily to the monopoly's own advantage and may not
contribute much to the advantage of the community.

POLITICAL ASPECTS
International cartels involve agreements as to international trade
among business enterprises domiciled in several nations. Frequently
certain parties to such an agreement are themselves international corporate combines with properties in various nations and with subsidiaries and dliates incorporated under the laws of these nations. In
developing and executing cartel arrangements the participants necessarily formulate policies toward international trade and toward the
exchange of information across national boundaries. Such policies
necessarily have political implications.
National states, like cartels, may undertake to restrict trade. But
whereas cartel restrictions are intended to serve the interests of cartel
members throughout the world at the expense of outsiders, the restrictions imposed by national states are intended to serve interests in a
particular nation at the expense of interests in other countries. Thus
cartel restrictions may conflict with national restrictions; and to
become an instrument of restrictive national policy in one country
a cartel must be also a means of attack upbn the national interests of
other countries. Cartels may express the collective interests of producing countries in exploiting consuming countries; but since cartels
are international, they might be expected to .resist subordination to
a particular producting country's national policy, and doubtless many
of them do so. However, when a cartel is dominated by the enterprises of a single nation, the economic control expressed in cartel policy
may take a political form as well, so that the activities of the cartel
supplement and reinforce the activities of the national state in which
the dominant concerns are domiciled.
The likelihood of such a result increases when the political purposes
of the national state are consistent with the restrictive policies of
cartel members in other countries, so that the national advantages
thereby achieved do not involve any immediate business injury to
foreign cartel members. A cartel may readily be used for political
ends if one nation's participating enterprises are politically minded
whereas those of other nationalities are concerned primarily with their
business interests.
The likelihood that national politics will influence a Artel is greatest
where the distinction between government and business is not sharply
maintained. In democratic states, with a tradition of business freedom
from governmental control, businessmen are seldom expected to

become the means of carrying out national policy and are likely,
regardless of expectations, to follow their own line.
In the instances of conflict between cartel policies and national
policies, two different types of motivation are evident. In some cases
cartel members were pursuing their business ends without regard to
the national interests of other countries or the national policy of their
own country. In other instances, .cartel members were consciopsly
serving the -political and economic purposes of a particular national
state, sometimes willingly and soriietimes reluctantly. Often both
motives were present-some participants acted willingly while others
acted far -business reasons. In general, American concerns were
unaware of or indifferent to the political significance of their acts,
but took part in cartels for business reasons.
Cartels and National Commercial Policy:
One of the most widespread of cartel activities is the allocation of
trade territories and industrial fields among the members of the cartel.
Such allocations necessarily express private international trade policies
which often conflict with, modify, or supersede the trade policies of
national governments. Cartel controls are supplements or substitutes
for the State's control of trade by tariffs, export and import licenses,
trade agreements, antidumping laws, and the rationing of foreign
exchange.
The relationship of a cartel to the tariff may be readily illustrated
from the chemical industry. Under an agreement between du Pont
and Imperial Chemical Industries, the latter recognizes the United
States market as the exclusive territory of du Pont for patented products and in practice abstains from selling unpatented products here as
well. Imperial Chemical Industries. controls almost the whole chemical
industry of Great Britain; and its agreement with du Pont covers its
entire line of chemical products, with a few important exceptions
such as alkali. Thus the agreement is the practical equivalent of a
prohibitory tariff upon the importation of British chemicals into the
United States. Trade policy in the matter is made by the two great
private companies and not by the American Government.
Whereas tariffs are ordinarily used in an endeavor to encourage the
development or maintenance of manufacture within the country which
imposes them, cartel regulations applicable to a particular national
market are likely to limit or discourage manufacture. An instance
-

is the control exercised by the quinine cartel over the United States
market. M o r e the present war the cartel followed a policy of allowing American manufacturers to make not more than half of our
domestic requirements of quinine. Only two American companies
were permitted to engage in manufacture, grid both were required
to purchw cinchona bark exclusively from the cartel. The exclusive
assignment of foreign territories to particular members of a cartel
necessarily defeats the policiei of national governments which may
be seeking to enlarge the flow of international trade between their
countries.and parts of the world not allocated by the cartel to their
flatid.
Althwgh private cartel arrangements may have the effect of tariffs,
the promotion of higher national t d s is often a part of the policy
of those who participate in cartels. A tariff may strengthen a cartel
member in his negotiation with other members for a larger share of
the world market. Moreover, a tariff may give protection against
independent enterprises which do not cooperate with the cartel and
against cartel members who undertake price wars as a disciplinary
or retaliatory device.
When the policies of -a cartel and a particular national government
are brought into harmony, the effect may be use of governmental
restrictions to reinforce the power of the cartel or use of the cartel to
aummplish the restrictive' purposes of the government. In 1938, the
French Government evidently undertook to give effect to the territorial allocations of the .dyestuffs cartel. Various cartels dominated
by German concerns during the period between the two World Wars
were used by the German Government to maintain German exports
and supplies of foreign exchange.
International cartels have usually acted as substantial deterrents to
the industrial development of parts of the world which their members
regard as colonial markets. Typically they have resisted the rise of
new enterprises abroad as well as at home. Cartels also resist the
estabIishment or the extension of undertakings by local capital. Such
policies of discouraging industrial development usually run counter
to the aspirations of the national governments immediately concerned.
In Latin America they run counter to the good-neighbor policy and
the development programs fostered by the Government of the United
States.
Because of their international character, cartel arrangements often

become convenient means by which to circumvent the legislation of
national. states. Avoidance of import duties and other taxes, evasion
of legal control over prices, arid similar activities are, of course, £requent among domestic enterprises. In international cartels, however,
the aid of foreign concerns is often available to create the pretenses
u n d e ~which' evasion takes place. Among the most conspicuous
examples of attempts to n u l y . national law by action taken beyond
a nation's boundaries are the efforts of cartels to extend their control
ov& the United States and yet evade the jurisdiction of the American
anti-trust laws.

Cartels and National Security:
In cartel policy, as in that of national states, trade relationships
often have diplomatic and military as well as economic significance.
The allocation of trade territories to German, British, or American
interests establishes exclusive trading ties which facilitate the development of political understandings among the governments of countries thus bound together by cartel policy.
The security problems raised by cartels during the last quarter- century have centered upon the revival of the military strength
of Germany and the political and military preparations of the Nazi
government for the present war. With cartel members outside
Germany often politically indifferent and in some cases subservient
to dominant German enterprises, and with the German members
of cartels increasingly subjected to the control of the state, cartel
activities between the two wars contributed to the development of
a rearmed and aggressive Germany and to the weakening of states
- which were likely to oppose German national policy.
I Cards and German Rearmament:-The
reestablishment of cartel
connections between German and Allied concerns in the munitions
industries apparently aided in creating an atmosphere of acquiescence
to the revival of German munitions production during the 1920's~
in violation of the Treaty of Versailles.

Cartf;~and Nazi Propaganda:-After the Nazi government came
into power, cartels vere extensively used for trade penetration, political propaganda, collection of strategic information about foreign
industries, and efforts to suppress the development of strategic industries in areas which might be hostile to Germany.
2.

In some cases, the trade alliance created by an international cartel
was so close that it resulted in the transmission of strategically important industrial information to German citizens and presumably to
the German government, to the detriment of the military security
of other nations. With public officials kept ignorant of the character
of cartel arrangements as to the transfer of idormation, intimate
details concerning technology, business operations, and even production for military use were -sometimes sent abroad.
The effect of various cartel arrangements in strategic industries
was also to prevent the development outside ' ~ e r m a n
of~a substantial
production of some -of the most important new materials of war.
This was the direct and necessary consequence of policies of restriction of output, restriction of new capacity, and suppression of new
technology, such as are characteristic of cartels.
In the case of magnesium, a cartel arrangement between I. G.
Farbenindustrie, the Aluminum Co. of America, and Dow Chemical
Co. established Dow as the sole producer of the metal in the United
States. d high-price policy, followed by Dow for its own purposes
and under pressure of the Aluminum Co.'s insistence that Dow not
offer a cheap substitute for aluminum, kept the output small. In 1938,
when German
had reached 12,000 tons, United States
production was only 2,400 tons. Moreover, Dow's exports were
limited to a specified amount to a single customer in Great Britain,
and to certain quantities which I. GoFarbenindustrie agreed to buy.
Dow might not otherwise export to the European Continent.
In the case of aluminum, soon after the Nazi Government took
power German aluminum producers, apparently acting under governmental pressure, insisted that they must no longer be bound by-the
restrictions imposed upon production by the international aluminum
cartel. The apprehension of aluminum producers in other countries
lest the increased German output reduce the European price was
allayed by an agreement that if there should be any increase in
German exports it would be fully offset by an equivalent increase
in Germany's imports. Thus the cartel continued its price proteaion
in nonoGerman markets by cheerful acquiescence in a policy which
assured to Germany a superiority in aluminum supply. The production of Diesel engines in the_ United States was apparently retarded
by the arrangements between American Bosch and Robert Bosch of
Germany.

Cartels and Economic Warfare:
The outbreak of war in 1 9 3 intensified the problem as to the
relation between national policies and cartel policies. Most cartels
recognized immediately that some modification of their pre-war
arrangements was made necessary by the new obstacles to freedom
of trade and free interchange of information. The cartel connections
between companies in belligerent nations were often wholly or partly
suspended under arrangements which contemplated the full renewal
of the agreement as soon as political conditions might permit. Cartel
members in neutral countries typically preserved their business connections with their cartel partners on both sides of the conflict, with
some modification of contracts to fit the new trading conditions.
As between belligerent cartel members, problems arose as to how far
trade connections might be maintained without violation of laws
against trading with the enemy. Cartel members in neutral countries
found it necessary to determine how far they would collaborate in
proposals designed to serve the interests of one belligerent as against
another.
In some cartels in which the relation of German and American
partners was very close, the American company undertook to safeguard its cartel interest and serve its German partner by forestalling
British measures to blockade enemy trade. I£ the Germans had formerly enjoyed exclusive rights in the South American market, permission has-g&en by German cartel members to their American partners
to supply the South American customers during the emergency provided the American concerds agreed to withdraw from the field after
the war. Less frequently the American partner assisted the German
company in obtaining supplies for shipment to Germany or in borrowing funds abroad.
During the period prior to America's entry into the war, American
paaicipants in cartels or corporate combines sometimes found. their
~urop&nestablisliments or their European cartel partners and licenses
in territory dominated by the Axis. Under these circumstances the
desire to maintain a prosperous business, coupled with the cartel connections already established with German concerns, sometimes facilitated a decision to cooperate with the conquerors.
Steps were also taken in various industries to bring about transfers
of property and assignments of patent rights which would convert
foreign property into domestic property. Two motives appear. On

the one hand, there was a desire to avoid the difficulties of wartime
communication by transferring to each member of a cartel the control
over properties to which that member had easy access. On the other
hand, there was a desire to conceal the foreign ownership of properties in order to forestall possible application of freezing regulations,
seizure by Alien Property Custodians, or other impairment of praperty rights in the interests of national policy. Immediately after the
outbreak of the war, in September 1939, Standard Oil Co. of New
Jersey worked out with I. GoFarben a readjustment of business to
avoid seizure of property in the countries in which the two companies
had patents.
.
A peculiarly interesting attempt to safeguard an international combine by changing its apparent national character was made by the
NoV. Philips organization. Before the war approximately 80 Philips
companies located primarily in Europe and South America were controlled by a holding company in Eindhoven, Holland. Anticipating
the invasion of Holland, Philips took advantage of the Corvo law,
which apparently had k n passed at its instigation, to move the head
offices of the company from Holland to Curacao, in the Dutch West
Indies, It entered into two trust agreements, respectively, with a
British' and an American bank, under which provisional trusteeships
were established over the Philips companies. The Midland Bank was
given jurisdiction over those in the ~ & s h Empire, the Hardord
Bank and Trust Co. over those in North and South America and
in Spain and Portugal.- The Curacao company was to continue to
control the subsidiaries in the Dutch East Indies, Sweden, and Switzerland. The trust agreements sought to combine a formal transfer of
authority to British and American nationals with an actual retention
of power by the Philips executive so long as they retained their freedom to act.
The most dangerous aspect of cartelization in wartime lies in the
continuance of mutual loyalties and of joint property interests which
unite concerns lying on opposite sides of the battle lines. Such connections with enemy nationals provide a standing incentive for q u a
fied allegiance to one's own belligerent nation. The existence of established contacts with enemy, concerns through concerns in peutra1
countries affords a constant opportunity to promote trade interests by
transmitting information and even supplies which may be of value
to the enemy.
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The problem is at its maximum in the wartime relationships of the
subsidiaries and aftiliates of a far-flung international combine parts
of which lie in enemy territory. The problem for such a combine is
not a simple conflict between patriotism and greed. There is a natural
desire to maintain property and profits. This desire is reinforced by
a persistent memory that if these can somehow survive. the war a
period will recur in which international trade and investment are
generally approved and by knowledge that even the laws of war
traditionally respect the property rights of private citizens except
where they intedere with military operations. There is also an awareness that refusal by any part of such a combine to collaborate with
the belligerent government controlling the country 05 its domicile
would merely lead to measures enforcing cooperation. The sacrifice
of property rights in a futile attempt to defeat the purposes of military
government is felt to be quixotic. In cultivating round-about trade
and exchange of information between belligerent countries, both parts
of the combine are aware of a national interest in-receiving what is
obtained from the other country and sometimes even in maintaining
national export trade. This view is reinforced by the fact that upon
occasion belligerent governments tacitly consent to the barter of goods
with the enemy through neutral intermediarik. With the steady
pressure of self-interest on the one side, and the inherently complex
character of patriotic duty on the other, it is easy for the directors
of a corporate combine to persuade themselves that there is no treason
in the pursuit of an obvious business advantage.
The peculiar conflict in the loyalties of an international combine
becomes most evident in the activities of its branches in neutral countries. Such branches are sometimes subject to the direction of a central
office maintained in the country of one belligerent but dependent for
supplies and markets upon the territory of another belligerent. In
sucii cases their continued existence depends upon finding means to
evade managerial instructions or to obtain orders consistent with their
continued prosperity.

P o s t w a r Planning by Cartels:,
The trend of cartel activity after the war will be profoundly
aflected by the military outcome. Great German cornpan& have been
used during the war as the nuclei of international combines which,
should they persist, necessarily will involve more extensive cartelization of the European Continent. The Hermann Goering Works, for

a m p l e , has grown through investments by the Reich, forced investment by private firms, co&scations of property, and purchase of property. In 1941, it controlled nearly IOO percent of Austrian and
Rumanian iron and steel production and more than 50 percent of
Polish iron and steel production. It also controlled nearly all of the
output of copper in Yugoslavia, nearly 80 percent of the production
of lignite in the Sudetenland, and more than 50 percent of the shipping
on the Danube. It was established in armament manufacture, construction, and trade from Norway to Rumania. Similarly, the war
has extended the control exercised by I. G. Farbenindustrie over the
manufacture of dyestuffs in Europe.
Assuming complete defeat of the Axis, arrangements such as these
presumably will not endure. The character of the cartel problem in
a post-war world established by the United Nations may be partially
forecast on the basis of the present activities and plans of those who
support cartels.
Many cartel arrangements are still in effect, with modifications
designed to meet conditions of war. Their continuance is evidence
of an *ntion
to maintain them in either an original or a modified
form after the war. In many cases, however, post-war cartel plans
are not matters of inference. Suspension of cartel arrangements in
wartime and their renewal as soon as possible thereafter has been
provided for by specific agreement.
Plans of cartelization after the war are not limited to the resumption
of agreements previously in effect. There are a considerable number
of ambitious proposals to form new cartel agreements and greatly
extend the scope of cartelization.
Such plans are of two types: First, there 'are programs in particular
industries to eliminate competition among some or all of the concerns
engaged therein.
-.
Second, various programs have been advanced for cartelization of
all industries with the approval of the governments of the principal
trading nations. In a recent discussion with the president of the
United States Chamber of Commerce, Lord McGowan, chairman of
the board of Imperial Chemical Industries, declared that he saw no
hope for post-war cooperation between British and American business
unless the American Sherman Act were repealed: One of the refugee
executives of the N. V. Philips Co. in the United States has formulated
a plan for general cartelization after the war.

The most ambitious of the publicly announced programs is that of
the World Trade Alliance, which is promoted from England by
Sir Edgar Jones, an executive of the international tin plate cartel.
This organization is engaged in propaganda for an industry-wide
series of governmentally sanctioned cartel agreements.
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